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**NATIONALISM IN VLADIMIR PUTIN'S RUSSIA:
BETWEEN SILENCE, EXTINCTION AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGICAL SIMULATIONS**

**NACIONALISMO RUSO EN VLADIMIR PUTIN:
ENTRE EL SILENCIO, LA EXTINCIÓN Y LAS SIMULACIONES IDEOLÓGICAS POLÍTICAS**

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Abstract

The author analyses the problems of the development of nationalisms in the modern Russian Federation, where nationalism is one of the most influential and ignored political ideologies simultaneously. The author believes that several typologies of nationalism are possible, including political and ethnic ones. Russian nationalism coexists simultaneously with non-Russian nationalisms that gained more political experience in previous years. It is assumed that nationalisms in Russia develop more slowly than in Europe. Therefore, Russian nationalism lost the historical competition with capitalism. The author believes that modern political elites perceive nationalism as an ideological enemy and try to suppress Russian and non-Russian nationalisms simultaneously, formally simulating and imitating the support of Russian nationalists.

Keywords

Russian Federation – Nationalisms – Identities – Russian nationalism – Non-Russian nationalism
Capitalism

Resumen

El autor analiza los problemas del desarrollo de los nacionalismos en la Federación Rusa moderna, donde el nacionalismo es una de las ideologías políticas más influyentes e ignoradas simultáneamente. El autor cree que son posibles varias tipologías de nacionalismo, incluidas las políticas y étnicas. El nacionalismo ruso coexiste simultáneamente con los nacionalismos no rusos que obtuvieron más experiencia política en años anteriores. Se supone que los nacionalismos en Rusia se desarrollan más lentamente que en Europa. Por lo tanto, el nacionalismo ruso perdió la competencia histórica con el capitalismo. El autor cree que las élites políticas modernas perciben el nacionalismo como un enemigo ideológico y tratan de suprimir los nacionalismos rusos y no rusos simultáneamente, simulando e imitando formalmente el apoyo de los nacionalistas rusos.

Palabras Claves

Federación Rusa – Nacionalismo – Identidad – Nacionalismo ruso – Nacionalismo no ruso – Capitalismo

Introductory remarks

Nationalism since the 19th century has become a universal factor in the political, social and cultural histories of Europe and the Americas, but the historical logic of Russian developments did not coincide with pan-European trends. If nationalism in Europe in the 19th century became a universal and inevitable factor in the history of social and political modernizations, then in Russian political spaces, including the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, nationalism was a marginal political factor and ruling political elites preferred to persecute and suppress nationalism. The 20th century was a difficult period in the history of nationalism in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. The Soviet Union developed as the unique political experiment and project, where the ruling political elites used various and mutually exclusive tactics and strategies in their relations with nationalism. Soviet elites, on the one hand, denied nationalism in its bourgeois forms, imagining it as a political and ideological enemy. On the other hand, many post-Soviet nations became modern nations only in the USSR.

Despite this, Soviet elites were able to synthesize and combine the values of the nation and the principles of the class. Soviet national policy inspired the progress, development and formal prosperity of several ethnic groups that became political nations and even nation-states. Soviet elites divided imagined nations in their own rooms in one large Soviet communal apartment, defining the administrative and political boundaries that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, became a state. Non-Russian ethnic groups were able to successfully and effectively use advantages and opportunities that the Soviet Union granted them and became political nations, transforming the category of ethnicity into a part of political culture, but not all formal Soviet nations used the capabilities of the Soviet regime successfully. The Russians were a nation that did not use Soviet opportunities for political and ethnic mobilization and consolidation. If non-Russian ethnic groups became political communities in the USSR, then the Russians were predominantly an ethnic nation that did not have its formal political institutions. Other ethnic groups were more successful in their attempts to modernize and become modern political nations and some of them could even come close to the status of nation-states. The disintegration of the USSR led to radical changes in national and ethnic politics, but not all the post-Soviet nations of Russia were able to effectively and successfully use the results and consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Therefore, post-Soviet political history became simultaneously a history of national successes of non-Russian ethnic groups and political failures and crises of the Russian nation, which was a formal majority in the Russian Federation.

External incentives for Russian nationalisms studies

The author presumes that the history and intellectual evolution of post-Soviet nationalisms are among the topical problems in contemporary Russian political science and historiography. On the one hand, the international academic historiography of nationalism prefers to analyze mainly the nationalisms of the minor nations. On the other hand, the number of works on Russian nationalism is very small and insignificant¹. Despite

¹ Egbert Jahn, The state-transformation in the East of Europe. "Second national rebirth". Nationalism, national movements, and the formation of nation-states in late and post-communist Europe since 1985, Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe. Vol. 1. The Failed Nationalism of the Multinational and Partial National States (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 19–81.

these historiographic disparities, Russian and non-Russian nationalisms became important and influential factors in the political history of modern Russia. The political processes that began in 2014 actualized the role of Russian nationalism, which was invisible some years earlier. Since the early 2000s, Russian ruling elites tried to assimilate national minorities consistently and decisively, began politically to repress and persecute ideological opponents, including nationalists in the republics of the Russian Federation.

The political crisis in Ukraine, Russian interference in the Ukrainian conflict stimulated the rise of Russian ethnic and political nationalisms. The current and actual history of Russia also provides historians and political scientists with numerous examples of progress and the activation of regional nationalisms. If Russian nationalism sought to assimilate non-Russian nations and ethnic groups, non-Russian nationalisms, on the contrary, opposed centralization tendencies and sought to protect the national identities that Russian nationalists prefer to ignore. Attempts of Russian nationalists to actualize the values and chimeras of the Russian nation, their desires to prohibit and restrict education in the national languages in the republics, the hysteria of Russian nationalists about the persecution and oppression of Russians in the subjects of the federation stimulated the rise of nationalisms in the republics that form the Russian Federation. All these factors make the academic analysis of modern nationalisms of the Russian Federation important and relevant.

Goal and tasks

Analysis of post-Soviet Russian and non-Russian nationalisms is the main goal of this article. This article also has several tasks, including an analysis of the genesis of modern nationalisms of post-Soviet Russia, the typology of nationalisms, the study of general trends in the history of post-Soviet nationalisms, and a comparative analysis of non-Russian post-Soviet nationalisms.

Methodological backgrounds

Methodologically, the author perceives nationalism as an invented tradition. Therefore, this article is theoretically rooted in the approaches proposed in the first half of the 1980s by Ernest Gellner², Benedict Anderson³, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger⁴. The author, on the one hand, believes that nationalisms became the primary products of modernization of high cultures of educated intellectual and political nations, and nations, the greater and the minor, became secondary consequences of modernization, including political, social and cultural transformations of archaic societies that lost their traditional character and inevitably became modern. The author presumes that any primordial explanations of nationalisms of any nation as attempts to historize it won't be effective because they will inspire mythologization of political history of nationalism and the place and status of a nation as the imagined community among other nations. On the other hand, the constructivist and modernist approaches will allow actualizing common features

² Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell University Press, 1983), 152.

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (NY: Verso, 1983) 224.

⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 212.

in the developments of political nationalisms of the post-Soviet spaces of Russia with Western ones because nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries was a universal political ideology, and its claims for political universalism were not refuted by competing for political doctrines in the 21st century. Political moderate and radical ethnic nationalisms of Russia as the part of post-Soviet space with its experience of authoritarianism and numerous heterogeneous historical and political memories are not an exception to this rule.

Historiographical situation

Historiography of nationalism, in general, is too extensive, but the number of works focused on post-Soviet nationalisms of Russia, in particular, is not so significant. Unfortunately, most of the works on nationalisms in post-Soviet Russia are written and published in Russian, which automatically makes them alien to international academic discourse and marginalizes the Russian impact to the studies of the history and ideology of nationalism. Russian and foreign historians prefer to analyze private cases of nationalisms, ignoring the problems of genesis, their historical and structural features and the role of modernizations in the context of the development and progress of nationalisms, the nations imagined by them, and invented political traditions.

What is this article about?

It is logical to formulate several introductory remarks that will explain what this article is about to potential readers. This article is the text with generalizing ambitions, but the author believes that it does not pretend to the generalization of the phenomenon of nationalism in modern Russia, which continues to be a post-Soviet country with numerous social and national problems, contradictions, and incomplete political reforms. The author does not plan to analyze the developmental features and ideological preferences of all post-Soviet nationalisms of modern Russia. The author will analyze only the general problems of the genesis, development, cultural and ideological evolution of nationalism, including Russian and non-Russian intellectual discourses, nationalistic imaginations and attempts to invent nationalist political traditions, practices and rituals. This article does not pretend to respond to topical and political questions about nationalisms in modern Russia. This article is only a modest attempt to introduce an interested academic reader into the problems what the post-Soviet nationalisms in Russia are and what are the main vectors of their ideological developments and intellectual transformations.

The unified logic of nationalism and local realities

The history of nationalism is universal despite the fact that the results of nationalist movements as incentives for the transformation of traditional and partially archaic communities into modern nations were different and vary from one national state to another. Historians involved in academic Nationalism Studies believe that it is possible to single out three periods in the history of any nationalism. The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch proposed three stages, including.

Stage A: development of national culture, based on the local language and its normal use in education, governance and economic life. The interest in the nation is present, but it has almost exclusively cultural and even folkloric character. National

activists are studying their native language and culture, trying to find the roots and origins of the nation they belong to. Nationalists form and imagine historical memory, although they themselves may not understand what they do.

Stage B: nationalists seek to gain civil rights and political self-government, for example, in the form of autonomy that legitimizes the movement for independence. A new generation of national activists and nationalists begins to actively participate in politics and conduct targeted propaganda among the population, which as they believe should become a nation. Nationalists face many difficulties, but they have succeeded in the transformation of traditional groups into political ones gradually.

Stage C: Nationalists as supporters and apologists for modernization are successful and create a social structure for their ethnic group in general. The complete social structure replaces the incomplete one and includes educated elites, classes of officials and entrepreneurs, free peasants and organized workers. The national movement becomes mass, the intellectuals represent a population that radically changed its status and became a political nation. Therefore, nationalists radicalize and realize that the national state, which personifies and symbolizes the imagined political and ethnic bodies of the nation, became the main goal of nationalism⁵.

These stages follow one after another only in imagined historical processes, but history does not know examples of ideal situations. The development and transformation of post-Soviet nationalisms were not an exception to the universal logic of the historical process. These three stages in the history of nationalisms in Russia chronologically could coincide, and the order and sequence of their alternation were violated. Some communities of the Russian Empire attempted to pass these stages before 1917, but the revolution and the radical Soviet form of political and socio-economic modernization changed the main vectors and trajectories of the development of nationalisms and nations. Some ethnic groups of the USSR passed these stages for the first time or repeatedly in the Soviet period. The collapse of the Soviet Union again actualized the universality of nationalism and the nations of the post-Soviet space began to re-pass through these stages in the transformation of nationalism again or even for the third time in their histories. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to typologize post-Soviet nationalisms and the nations they were able to imagine. On the one hand, it is possible to assume that, from a formal point of view, most nationalisms are political, but this idea will be nothing more than an idealistic liberal assumption and it has little in common with the political processes and realities of post-Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the real situation in the ideological preferences of post-Soviet nationalisms is extremely far from liberal idealizations and it is possible to divide post-Soviet nationalisms into ethnic, political and cultural ones, although this typology is another step in the idealization and mythologization of nationalism because most post-Soviet nationalisms combine effectively all three forms of nationalistic discourse. Therefore, it is practically impossible to single out the ideal pure political, ethnic, cultural or linguistic nationalisms in modern post-Soviet Russia.

⁵ Miroslav Hroch, *European Nations: Explaining Their Formation* (NY: Verso, 2015), 336; Miroslav Hroch, *The historical conditions of "nationalism" in Central and East European countries, Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe. Vol. 1. The Failed Nationalism of the Multinational and Partial National States* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 97–109.

Russian nationalism: only one of...

It is logical to assume that Russian nationalism is central among the post-Soviet nationalisms of the modern Russian Federation. Formally, the Russians constitute the majority of the population of Russia, but non-Russian nationalisms⁶ in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods were more active in protecting their national and political interests. Russian nationalism developed as fragmented and several different mutually exclusive trends coexisted in Russia nationalism between the 1990s and 2010s. Different trends of Russian nationalism had various ideologies, but they were all equally marginal. Traditional Russian nationalism of orthodox orientation was the first trend in post-Soviet nationalism. Another trend of Russian nationalism used Soviet narratives actively and closely intertwined with the communist movement. If the first trend advocated the restoration of the Russian Empire, then the second requires the restoration of the Soviet Union. Nationalists, including monarchists and national communists, believe in Russian special *Sonderweg*, the need to return all lands and regions, which were parts of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.

Supporters of traditional monarchical nationalism and nationalists of the Communist orientation can profess mutually exclusive ideas, including Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism, and Stalinism. Neopaganism is one more trend in the actual history of Russian nationalism. Supporters of the Slavic neopaganism, who believe in the many thousands of years Russian history falsify historical sources actively, but they are marginalized as other Russian nationalists. National democrats form the fourth trend in Russia nationalism. National democrats try to unite and combine the values of democracy and the principles of nationalism, insisting on the need of European way for Russia. National democrats as radical Russian nationalists, including Stalinists and monarchists, are marginal and virtually invisible in Russia because the ruling political elites are marginalized by nationalists actively and deliberately who offer alternative programs and concepts for Russian political development. Russian nationalism as the nationalism of the ethnic majority developed under the shadow of the minor nationalisms that were more active than the nationalism of the formally predominant group.

Russian nationalism in the 21st century was less successful than its political rivals. On the one hand, Russian nationalism cannot compete with other secular political ideologies, including liberalism and communism. On the other hand, Russian nationalism does not have many successes in competition with the trends of archaization, including Christianity and Islam as traditional forms of religion. Several factors, including the impossibility of nationalism to integrate into the official ideological discourse, which only simulated and imitated ideology, the inability of Russian nationalists to compete with the nationalists of other nations, the voluntary aspirations of Russian nationalists in the captivity of myths and stereotypes stimulated the crisis and the fall of Russian nationalism. The actual history of Russian nationalism in the early 21st century was not much different from the earlier stages of its historical development, because nationalists in the 20th and 21st centuries were equally untenable and unsuccessful in their inability to integrate themselves into various dominant political and ideological discourses and reach a

⁶ Leokadiya M. Drobizheva, Nationalisms in the Russian Federation Republics (Sakha, North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva): Elite ideology and mass consciousness, Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe. Vol. 3. Nationalism in the National Territorial Units (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 27-52.

compromise with other political actors and consolidation of nationalist segments of Russian political field.

Non-Russian nationalisms: preliminary orientations

The non-Russian nationalisms of post-Soviet Russia are very diverse. It is almost impossible to offer the common typology of non-Russian nationalisms, but the author believes that several approaches are possible. Non-Russian nationalisms in their history passed several periods, including the three stages proposed by Miroslav Hroch. Non-Russian nationalisms have several common features that characterize the main trends of their developments, including slowed rates of social and political developments, the simultaneous coexistence of moderate and radical trends, a compromise between former Soviet officials who became political state nationalists and nationalist-minded intellectuals and cultural activists. Non-Russian nationalisms differed from Russian nationalism because they were more effective in protection and defence of their political interests.

Therefore, non-Russian nationalists could institutionalize their achievements because they were able to radically transform the former Soviet autonomies and create national republics. Some regional nationalists were so active and successful that they were able to proclaim their republics as the states and fix it in the constitutions. The historical and political memories of regional nationalisms in Russia are heterogeneous: versions of national history can be radically different and some historical myths and narratives are rooted in the denial of the same myths of other nations. On the one hand, non-Russian nationalisms can be described as political and ethnic. On the other hand, non-Russian nationalisms can be divided into related groups, including Turkic nationalisms, Finno-Ugric nationalisms, North Caucasian nationalisms. Non-Russian nationalisms of post-Soviet Russia can also be divided into visible and invisible because degrees of visibilities and influences of nationalisms are extremely diverse.

Turkic nationalisms in the Russian Federation, including the Tatar⁷, Bashkir⁸, Chuvash⁹ and Yakut¹⁰, belong to a number of dynamically developing nationalisms. Finno-

⁷ Gertjan Plets, Ethno-nationalism, asymmetric federalism and Soviet perceptions of the past: (World) heritage activism in the Russian Federation, *Journal of Social Archaeology*, Vol. 15, No 1, (2014) 67 – 93; Aurora Alvarez Veinguer, Howard H. Davis, Building a Tatar elite. Language and national schooling in Kazan, *Ethnicities*, Vol. 7, No 2, (2007) 186-207; Damir M. Iskhakov The Tatarstan's model and Tatar nationalism, *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*. Vol. 3. Nationalism in the National Territorial Units (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 93 – 109.

⁸ Daniel E. Schafer, Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920, *A State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* / eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 165 – 191; Fail' G. Safin Contemporary Bashkir nationalism, *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*. Vol. 3. Nationalism in the National Territorial Units (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 110 – 127.

⁹ Hèctor Alòs i Font, Chuvash Language in Chuvashia's Instruction System: An Example of Educational Language Policies in Post-Soviet Russia, *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol 13, No 4, (2014) 52 – 84; Uyama Tomohiko, From "Bulgharism" through "Marrism": to Nationalist Myths: Discourses on the Tatar, the Chuvash and the Bashkir Ethnogenesis, URL: <http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/acta/19/uyama.pdf>

¹⁰ Praskovia Sivtseva-Maksimova, Letter "To the Yakut Intelligentsia" by A. E. Kulakovsky: setting and features of the problem of survival of indigenous peoples of the North in the early 20th century, URL: <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1121251.pdf>; Daniel R. Kempton, The republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The evolution of centre-periphery relations in the Russian federation, *Europe-Asia*

Ugric nationalisms¹¹ are less visible than Turkic ones or Russian. The nationalisms of the Caucasian ethnic groups differ from the Turkic and Finno-Ugric. If the Turkic and Finno-Ugric nationalisms develop as ideological nationalisms that are involved in real politics, then the North Caucasian nationalisms develop as opportunistic and predominantly economic ones. If the Turkic and Finno-Ugric groups became nations as imagined communities, then the North Caucasian ethnic groups¹² transformed and mutated into nation-corporations. Almost all regional nationalisms were able to transform their autonomies into national republics, but the successes of nationalists in the building of national statehoods were different. Tatarstan had real political and state ambitions¹³, its elites proclaimed the status of the state in general and the nation-state in particular and came closer than other regions to real political independence.

The Turkic regions, including Bashkortostan and Chuvashia, were also more successful in their attempts to develop their nationalisms and nation-states than Finno-Ugric regions, where the titular nations were a minority in comparison with the Russian population. Ethnic and religious components, historical myths and national memories played different roles in Turkic nationalisms. The Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552 is a very painful aspect of the Tatar national memory. Chuvash official nationalists, on the contrary, idealize the Russian factor. Chuvash and Tatar nationalists also have numerous mutual claims, including the historical and political heritage of the Volga Bulgaria, because Tatar nationalists imagine it as a Tatar state, and the Chuvash nationalists provide it with elements of Chuvash identity, ethnicity and statehood. The factor of statehood is also critical for Chechen identity because the existence of statehood actualizes the historical and political trauma of the Chechen nation, which became a victim of deportation. Therefore, the belief in the need to restore statehood became one of the central ideas of Chechen nationalism and a stimulus for an active nationalist movement. The Turkic and Finno-Ugric nationalisms were victims of a new wave of Russification that began in the 2000s. Other nationalisms, including Chechen and partly Ingush, proved more successful in their attempts to adapt to the new Russian authoritarianism that actively imitated and feigned democracy because they could transform from pure ideological nationalism into

Studies, Vol. 48, No 4, (1996) 587 – 613; Victoria V. Mikhailova, Valery B. Nadkin, Ethno-confessional identity and complementarity in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), *Psychology in Russia: State of the Art*, Vol. 9, No 1, (2016) 74 – 83; Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, Uliana Vinokurova, Nationalism, interethnic relations and federalism: The case of the Sakha republic (Yakutia), *Europe Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No 1, (1996) 101 – 120,

¹¹ Konstantin Zamyatin, Ethnic origins of Finno-Ugric nations and modern Finno-Ugric nationalism in the Russian Federation, URL: <http://www.suri.ee/papers/zamjatine.html>; Martin W. Lewis, Russian Xenophobia and the History of the Finnic-Speaking Peoples, URL: <http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/russian-xenophobia-and-the-history-of-the-finnic-speaking-peoples>

¹² Sufian Zhemukhov, Nationalism and Islam in Russia's North Caucasus, *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 131, 8 July (2013); Marlène Laruelle, Russia's Gordian Knot: radical nationalism, the North Caucasus, and migration, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 2011, September, No 163, URL: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_163.pdf

¹³ Christopher Williams, Tatar nation building since 1991: Ethnic mobilisation in historical perspective, URL: <http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2011/Williams.pdf>; Robin Smith, A Tale of Tubeteikas: Understanding the Effect of Ethnic Nationalism on the Relationship between Russia and Tatarstan, URL: https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/60488/1/CSEES_MWSC_2014_Smith_paper.pdf; Fabio De Leonardis, Nationalizing Kazan': Tatar state nationalism and architecture, URL: http://iass-ais.org/proceedings2014/view_lesson.php?id=138; Charles J. Sullivan, Nationalism and Nostalgia in the Tatar Republic, URL: <https://gwucpw.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/cp-workshop-paper.pdf>

nationalism of the client type. This nationalism was able to receive preferences from the centre because local elites simulated regional loyalty. The values of the nation and identity in post-Soviet nationalisms of Russia, unfortunately, were weaker than the economic interests of regional corrupted political elites.

Nationalisms vs capitalism: Russian version

The nationalisms of modern Russia are very diverse. Nationalisms in the republics and national regions can be defined as relatively normal ones with complete social structures, despite the fact that these regions became victims of Russification and gradually lost their national identities, including languages and cultures. The author believes that the tendency to substitute ideological nationalism with a substratum of ethno-ornamentalism is the main threat to regional nationalisms. Ethno-ornamentalism does not reproduce identity and does not offer new meanings - it can only imitate and simulate national identities. Imitation and simulation became the main cultural languages and strategies of modern quasi-nationalism because it lost links with previous nationalisms and their cultural and intellectual nationalistic experiences which ceased to be understandable for it. Ethno-ornamentalism is not only and exclusively a regional problem. Trends of ethno-ornamentalism are evident in Russian nationalism, too, where the scale of this process cannot be compared with similar markers in the regional nationalisms of the republics that form the Russian Federation.

The idea of "national bonds" proposed by the ideologues of Vladimir Putin's regime several years ago was the most vivid and visual expression of modern ethno-ornamentalism in its Russian version. Actually, the national policy of contemporary Russian elites and their periodic attempts to actualize the mobilization potential of nationalism have nothing in common with nationalism. In fact, the successes of Russian officials in the transformation of the national idea into a part of state policy criminalized nationalism and its derivatives, including the nation and identity. Russian culture offers mass and costly projects in the genre of pseudo-historical films instead of national identity and this strategy visualize the collective ideas of Russian elites what nationalism is. Actually, the visualization of identity became another form of ethno-ornamentalism. Visualization and ethno-ornamentalism are not interested in modern Russian elites. They use them only as a means to redistribute financial state flows. Russian and regional nationalists after the collapse of the Soviet Union could not understand that Russia became a bourgeois country where the values of capitalism became the only ideology.

Therefore, modern Russian political elites do not notice and ignore attempts of intellectuals to question the components of their political faith, but none, even the timidest attempt, to question the fairness of income distribution and to encroach even one percent is not ignored by Russian elites, but strictly repressed by them. This situation was the result of the fact that Russia missed several stages in the history of nationalism, including the dominance of foreign cultures and the genesis of national capitalism. Victims of discrimination in Russia were simultaneously Russian and non-Russian groups. Russians became victims of social and political discrimination, inspired by the ruling elites. Religious and linguistic discriminations of national minorities were added to the two forms of discrimination political elites used in the Russian regions. Russian and regional nationalisms could not resist the logic of the market because the history of Russia almost did not know what the capitalist modernization was because the country in general and its ethnic groups, in particular, were victims of Soviet social, economic and political

experiments of forced modernization and accelerated replacement of traditional and archaic groups and communities with modern forms of social and political organization. Russian and regional nationalists in the Russian Empire and the USSR fought with assimilation attempts successfully and effectively, defended their languages and cultures resolutely, but they were powerless to compete with capitalism which marketed and monetized natural resources but preferred to ignore nationalism as historical archaic rudiment.

Preliminary results

Nationalism became an important political factor in the social and cultural history of post-Soviet Russia. In fact, nationalism in post-Soviet Russia develops as political norm despite attempts of the ruling elites to proclaim it the extremist ideology. The Moscow elite in the 2010s began to support Russian and some regional nationalisms, including Chechen one, and pursue all other regional nationalisms because regional elites tried to realize their internal interests when Chechen elites became strongly pro-Kremlin, and their leader stressed repeatedly that he was ready to fulfil any the president's order. The trajectories and vectors of the development of post-Soviet nationalisms are very different, but they have a lot in common because the starting conditions for the development and progress of nationalism were the same. The nationalisms of Russian and non-Russian nations in Russia develop as the consequences of Soviet political legacy and post-Soviet intellectual and political transformations.

By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian and non-Russian nationalisms had various experiences of political, social and intellectual developments, but these nationalisms were invented traditions with different political symbols and rituals, but the traditions of non-Russian nationalisms and their nationalistic experiences were more visible and noticeable than the same achievements of non-Russian nationalists. By the critical historical moment when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Russian and non-Russian nationalisms had different political institutions and traditions. The development of Russian and non-Russian nationalisms became possible after social, cultural and ideological mutations and transformations inspired by modernization. Despite the visible successes and achievements of Soviet authoritarian undemocratic modernization, mutations that stimulated progress and the triumph of nationalisms in Russia occurred later than the same processes in the countries of the West. Social, political and cultural identities in Russia became independent later than in Western Europe.

If estates and classes, regional traditional and cultural identities in Europe ceased to be consolidating factors in that historical era when the dynastic state as an institution died and capitalism became the dominant and determining factor, the social and cultural mutations that inspired the separation of social and political roles and functions occurred in Russia later than in the West. The social speed of the cultural and political transformations in Russia, that preceded the USSR, were slower than in capitalist Europe where the historical triumph of capitalism turned nationalisms and imagined nations and nation-states into universal historical actors. The achievements of non-Russian nationalists were more visible and non-Russian nationalisms had their own cultural and intellectual traditions and political institutions as well, including forms of national quasi-statehoods. Russian nationalism when the Soviet Union fell into a crisis and broke up was less visible and influential. Russian and non-Russian nationalisms developed under different conditions,

but the starting conditions for their emergence and subsequent political progress had much in common.

Russian and non-Russian nationalisms in their political and intellectual evolutions went through the same stages of development. The historical triumph of post-Soviet nationalisms coincided chronologically with the 1990s as an era when political elites were trying to build a Russian version of capitalism. The progress of nationalism during this period emphasizes that nationalism is one of the bourgeois political ideologies. The triumph of post-Soviet nationalisms was the result of a crisis or weakening of earlier collective communities and identities that were destroyed or became so weak that they could not compete with the universality of the ideology of nationalism. The nation in post-Soviet Russia became a social individual, replacing other communities, including classes. Despite this, the trajectories of the development and further evolution of the nationalisms of Russia remain vague and uncertain. Two factors will assist in this situation. On the one hand, the Russian elites demonstrated their readiness to revive the old methods of fighting against “bourgeois” nationalism with the slight difference with the Soviet era that frankly nationalistic ideas began to mask the assimilation policy because the elites decided that there is no sense to hide ideological slogans. On the other hand, the elites of modern Russia preferred policy of consistent archaization and they are too ambitious in their attempts to replace the modern political values of the nation and class with archaic religious, Christian or Islamic, preferences because religion is among factors that allow elites to control power and declare nationalist and class ideologies too marginal and dangerous simultaneously.

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